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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

January 26, 1966

His column which appeared in this morning's Washington Post, entitled "Well, What Can He Do?" is illustrative of the enlightened character of his comments.

I ask unanimous consent that this column be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 25, 1966]

TODAY AND TOMORROW: WELL, WHAT CAN HE DO?

(By Walter Lippmann)

The reason why the peace offensive failed is most cogently revealed in the Mansfield report on the state of the war. Mr. Johnson has been trying to obtain by propaganda the victory which he has not been able to obtain on the battlefield—that is to say, the acceptance in the whole of South Vietnam of a government which has lost control of a very large part of South Vietnam. The peace offensive was bound to fail, and the grave decisions which the President hoped to circumvent and avoid are now before him.

If he is to make these decisions wisely, he must recognize that in international politics peace settlements are possible only as and when they reflect the real balance of power. In the World War, for example, Churchill and Roosevelt had to settle with Stalin for a Soviet political frontier in the midst of Germany and of Europe. That is where the Red army had arrived when the peace negotiations began. The same principle will hold in Vietnam. There will be no settlement until the terms of peace reflect the military reality.

The President will be disappointed again and again as long as he and Secretary Rusk ask for a settlement which in effect demands that the defeat of the Saigon forces be transmuted at the conference table into a victory for the Saigon forces. Nor should he indulge in any illusion that the informed opinion of mankind really thinks as Secretary Rusk talks merely because American envoys have been politely and sympathetically received in so many capitals.

What then should the President do? It is often said by the President's supporters that his critics propose no alternative to what he is doing. If that was ever true, it is no longer true today. It is not true since the Mansfield report and since the Gavin statement. The President should reduce his war aims, which today are impossibly high in the light of the conditions described in the Mansfield report. He should alter his strategy along the lines proposed by General Gavin, making it a holding operation pending the eventual negotiation of a political settlement.

The Mansfield report shows that Mr. Rusk's objective—the rule of General Ky or his successor over the whole of South Vietnam—is unattainable no matter how much the war is escalated. The burden of disproving the conclusions of the Mansfield report is on those who have been proved wrong about the escalation of last summer, on those who are now asking for another escalation in order to redeem their failure, on those who want to redouble the stakes in order to recoup their losses.

If the Mansfield report contains the truth of the matter, it follows inevitably that our war aims should be reduced and our strategy revised. We should put aside the hopeless task of searching out and destroying the Vietcong, and we should take our stand, as General Gavin advises, on a holding operation in the coastal cities.

This is not a policy for a glorious victory or for some kind of dazzling political triumph. It is no trick for pulling rabbits

out of a hat. It is a formula for liquidating a mistake, for ending a war that cannot be won at any tolerable price, for cutting our losses before they escalate into bankruptcy, and for listening to commonsense rather than to war whoops and tomtoms.

Because we are neither omniscient nor omnipotent, we, even we Americans, cannot always win. But I cannot help feeling in my bones that a display of commonsense by a proud and imperious nation would be a good moral investment for the future.

SENATOR MCCARTHY'S RESOLUTION ON THE CIA

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on Monday Senator McCarthy offered a Senate resolution (S. Res. 210) providing for "a full and complete study with respect to the effects of the operations and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency upon the foreign relations of the United States." Under the resolution, this task would be undertaken by the Foreign Relations Committee or an authorized subcommittee, and report would be made by January 31, 1966.

On Sunday the Washington Post presented an editorial commenting on the McCarthy proposal and his intention to offer the resolution. The editorial lifts up and comments on the point that the CIA has attained very great importance "as a factor in the formulation and execution of foreign policy."

As the editorial notes, the question whose study is called for does not deal with the more controversial question of whether or not the CIA should be involved in formulating or carrying out foreign policy, but with "the effects of its operations" on our foreign relations.

This is a proper sphere for concern of the Foreign Relations Committee. The area marked out by the resolution is not in conflict with that which is presently under jurisdiction of Armed Services and Appropriations Subcommittees. This, too, the Washington Post editorial points out.

I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the item to which I have referred may appear in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Jan. 23, 1966]

CONGRESS AND CIA

Senator EUGENE MCCARTHY has announced that he intends to seek Senate authorization for an investigation of the impact of the CIA on U.S. foreign policy. The mechanism for this would be a new subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the CIA or—should the Senate prefer—a broader select committee. This is not the first attempt to bring the CIA under congressional surveillance. At the time of his death, the late Brian McMahon had indicated his intention to work for a Joint Congressional Committee on Central Intelligence as a followup to his successful fight to establish the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Majority Leader MANSFIELD and his 34 co-sponsors envisaged just such a joint committee in their ill-fated 1958 resolution; and Senator McCarthy himself has kept the issue alive since. But the present move is unprecedented in its sharp focus on the importance of the CIA as a factor in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

There can be little doubt that the institutionalized growth of the intelligence arm of our Government during the cold war years has impinged to a very great extent on what has traditionally been the exclusive sphere of the State Department. The CIA's experts in Saigon or Santo Domingo assess many of the same matters that preoccupy embassy political officers, and its operatives necessarily stir up dark waters that a diplomat might prefer to leave undisturbed. While on paper the CIA answers to the Ambassador in a foreign capital, in case after case the tail has wagged the dog. President Kennedy's Executive order of May 1961, reaffirming the authority of the Ambassador, has had relatively little practical meaning.

Senator McCarthy does not enter directly into the controversy over whether or not the new power of the CIA is a desirable and indeed unavoidable response to a new kind of global political contest. His concern appears to be primarily that this power be made subject to congressional restraints—and that the committees of Congress dealing with foreign policy have a central place in overseeing the CIA.

The establishment of the proposed subcommittee would be a desirable first step indicating a recognition by Congress that the Foreign Relations Committee has a proper interest in the affairs of the CIA. Both the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees have long had subcommittees on the CIA, and these bodies now hold informal joint meetings with CIA officials at irregular intervals in which the Foreign Relations Committee should be given a voice. Beyond this, the work of the new subcommittee in examining the record of the CIA could be a valuable guide for future congressional action, though it should be self-evident that this examination would have to be conducted under ground rules not normally acceptable to Congress.

REPORT ON SOUTH AMERICA—TRIBUTE TO JACK HOOD VAUGHN

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, last November, during the interim, the distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH] and I made an extensive tour of South America. We visited four countries—Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—and in each one we sought information on the economy, the people, and the government. Also, we sought to check on the effectiveness of our programs involving Latin America, seeking guidance on matters which will be coming before the Senate.

Among the highlights of our 3-week trip, as far as I am concerned, were our visits with the Peace Corps volunteers and the opportunity to watch them working among the people of Latin America in the fields and villages and in the crowded slum sections of some of the cities. I was deeply impressed by the dedication, the intelligence, and the ability of these Americans who are serving the cause of humanity in faraway places. The Peace Corps volunteers, I discovered, are in close contact with the people, are trusted and respected, and have a real feeling of the conditions in the countries where they serve.

Before making the South American trip, I was briefed by Jack Hood Vaughn, who then served as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. Mr. Vaughn is a talented and dedicated administrator, and the insight I gained from our visit was most helpful